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General Introduction
Regardless of one's theoretical framework concerning the nature of time (i.e., whether it exists or not, cf. McTaggart, 1908 ; Rovelli 2018), we can certainly feel the passage of time, we have a sense of temporal order, and we perceive events as having certain durations. Time is real to us, and it is fundamental to our conscious experience (Dennett & Kinsbourne, 1992; Van Wassenhove, 2017) . Strictly speaking, we don't have a sense for duration and time as we have for light waves (the visual system) or air pressure waves (the auditory system). is makes the study of how we perceive time mysterious and challenging, but at the same time extremely interesting.
Instead of having a sense for time, the perception of duration seems to be an epiphenomenon of processes within our minds (cf., Gibson, 1975; Hass & Durstewitz, 2016; Matthews & Meck, 2016; Michon, 1990) . From an evolutionary perspective, John A. Michon stated that our ability to represent time underlies "… the need to stay in tune with a dynamic, unfolding outside world" (Michon, 1990, p. 55) . Within this quote lies another crucial remark: the world we inhabit is dynamic and unfolding, there is no thing, event or activity that is not extended in time and therefore has a duration. In the world we inhabit, changes in time are often accompanied by changes in another dimension or properties, too. Cooking recipes, for example, often use time indications and indications about the change of a speci c feature of an ingredient interchangeably: "In a separate pan, heat the oil and 1 small knob of butter over a low heat, add the onions, garlic and celery, and fry gently for about 15 minutes, or until soft but not coloured" ( Jamie Oliver, A basic risotto recipe, step 2 2 ). In this example, instead of setting a timer to 15 minutes, one can instead keep an eye on the consistency and color of the ingredients. is thesis explores time in relation to other dimensions.
Within the eld of temporal cognition, the main theories of time perception have been formalized in various models (see overview on the next two pages). e models described here can be roughly classi ed into two camps: dedicated clock models, which assume that interval perception is a "stand alone" cognitive process (e.g., SET and SBF); and those that see time as an intrinsic property of other cognitive processes (e.g., neural energy model, SDN models, CCM and memory decay models). When surveying the literature on timing models, some of the much discussed models do not really belong to either category. First, there is the A eory Of Magnitude (ATOM) model, proposing one common system for all magnitudes (e.g., time, space, number). ATOM makes no clear or detailed assumptions about the underlying mechanisms of time perception (or of other magnitudes, respectively). e second exception are Bayesian Observer Models and sequential-update models, which are, rst and fore-Scalar Expactancy Theory 1,2 In SET models the internal clock system consists of a pacemaker, which continuously emits pulses, a switch, which acts as a start signal to accumulate pulses in the accumulator. e number of accumulated pulses is then stored in a memory component, and, if necessary, compared to other durations stored in a reference memory in order to make a decision. e rate of pulse generation is thought to be in uenced by, e.g., arousal or attention, explaining the commonly found distortions of time perception. e contingent negative variation (CNV), a slow EEG signal that typically develops from stimulus onset until stimulus o set, has been discussed to re ect the accumulation of time in the brain 3 ; while the supplementary motor area (SMA) has been proposed as locus of the accumulator 4,5 .
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Models of Time/Sequence cells
Cells throughout the brain can encode moments in time (e.g., hippocampus 11 , medial prefrontal cortex 12 , medial frontal cortex 13 , presupplementary motor cortex 14 , medial agranular cortex 15 , lateral entorhinal cortex 16 , and striatum 17 ). e cells' behaviour can vary from, e.g., ramping activity 14,16 , time-selective activity 11 or other nonlinear activity patterns 13 . Some cells encode time in a relative manner, i.e., their activity patterns are scalable 13,17 . Importantly, this body of research is mainly concerned with the encoding of episodic or sequential time. Episodic timing does not necessary require precise metric timing in the sense of interval timing, but duration can be inferred 18 .
time cells
A Theory Of Magnitude 6,7,8 Time, number, space, speed and other magnitudes that can be experiences as ‚more than' or ‚less than' are processes by one common magnitude system. e parietal cortex is discussed as a candidate neural substrate for the generalized magnitude system. Behavioural magnitude interference e ects (e.g., larger stimuli last longer than smaller stimuli) are interpreted as evidence for the ATOM framework. ATOM does not explicitly specify at which processing state magnitudes are translated into a common metric. Recent behavioral studies suggest that di erent magnitudes are encoded dimension-speci c, and stored in a common memory system 9,10
Neural energy model 22 Coding e ciency could act as a signature of subjective duration, in that the amount of neural energy required to represent a stimulus is proportional to the subjective duration assigned to that stimulus. e neural energy model can explain temporal illusions: e.g., subjective time contraction caused by repetition (less neural energy -less subjective time), or subjective time dilation for lled versus empty intervals (more neural energy -more subjective time). It further implies that low-level neural signatures play an important role in duration perception.
State Dependent Network models 26, 27 Cortical networks implicitly encode temporal information as a result of time-dependent changes in excitatory-inhibitory interactions, which influence the population response to sensory events in a history-dependent manner. Here, durations are represented as spatial neural activation patterns that do not occur in a dedicated system, but throughout the entire cortical system. Evidence mainly comes from simulations and in vitro studies 28 20 , there is only little evidence for the speci c mechanism proposed 21 .
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Sequential-update models
Similar to Bayesian Observer Models, sequential-update models assume that we rely on an internal reference memory for duration rather than on the current percept. Examples of sequential-update models are the Internal Reference Model (IRM) 36,37 and the mixed-pool model 38 . e internal reference memory is dynamically updated by integrating previously presented and current durations as a weighted average.
Memory decay models
(Short-term) memories of perceived events decay over time, and thus inherently allow to infer duration from decaying memory strength. For example, the memory derived multiple-time-scale (MTS) model 23,24 incorporates a series of slower and faster exponential leaky integrators from which duration information can be read out. Models developed for processes other than interval timing, e.g., the Temporal Context Model 25 , can in fact also do interval timing tasks.
Bayesian Timing
31,32
e Bayesian Timing framework postulates that a percept of an interval is in fact an integration of noisy sensory information and prior experience. Speci cally, in computational Bayessian Observer Models the perceived duration of the current trial (likelihood) is integrated with previously encountered intervals (prior) to obtain the subjective percept (posterior), which will subsequently be used for interval estimates. Neurobiologically, Bayesian integration has been found to be re ected in the geometry and dynamics of neural circuits 33 . Bayesian models can model the perception of other magnitudes, too 34, 35 . A hierarchical neural network model of visual object classication modi ed to accumulate salient events when fed with any kind of video (more salient changes, longer estimated durations and vice versa). If the di erence between two consecutive frames exceeds an adaptive threshold (i.e., a salient change in the visual scene), a unit of subjective time is accumulated. Salient events are accumulated on di erent levels of the neural network (higher levels are more responsive to object like features of the visual scene, while lower layers respond to more primitive features). CCM does not rely on any kind of pacemaker or internal clock. When compared to human time estimates, the model exhibits the same biases as human participants do. most, instantiations of a computational framework. I will not discuss or evaluate the models introduced in the Overview here, I will occasionally refer to some of them in the empirical chapters (Chapters 1 to 4), and I will return to the topic in the nal chapter, in which I will discuss four selected models in light of the ndings presented in this thesis. In Chapter 1 we initially set out to nd EEG markers that are unique to the processing of time compared to the processing of numerosity. In the task we designed (referred to as the Raindrops task) participants saw small blue drops dynamically appearing and disappearing on the screen for a speci c duration. Two dimensions of these stimuli were manipulated simultaneously: time (i.e., the interval marked by the appearance of the rst drop and the disappearance of the last drop) and numerosity (i.e., the total number of drops appearing). In each trial, we presented two of these Raindrops stimuli consecutively and asked participants to indicate whether the second stimulus was shorter or longer if they were cued to make a judgement about the dimension time; or whether the second stimulus consisted of fewer or more drops if they were cued to make a judgement about the dimension numerosity. In both the time and time-frequency domain EEG signals we found no or only ambiguous evidence for a di erence between the processing of time and numerosity. Puzzled by these results, we took a closer look at the behavioral data. In an extensive post hoc analysis we found that, when asked to judge time, participants were in uenced by the task irrelevant numerosity information. is e ect is also known as temporal interference e ect. For example, if the second stimulus was shorter, but consisted of more drops than the rst stimulus, participants were more likely to erroneously respond 'longer'. To quantify these interference e ects, we used a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure to estimate, for each participants and each condition separately, how much temporal and numerical evidence was taken into account when making a judgement. Essentially, the outcome of this procedure were two ML-estimates, one weighing temporal evidence, the other weighing numerosity evidence. We then selected those participants who, according to their ML-estimates, took the task relevant dimension much more strongly into account than the task irrelevant dimension (e.g., in the time judgement task these participants would have a relatively high ML-estimate for temporal evidence, and a relatively low estimate for numerosity evidence), and we repeated the EEG analyses on these subsets of participants. e results were still inconclusive. Event related potentials that once have been related to the processing of time and time only (CNV: Macar, Vidal, & Casini, 1999; but see Boehm, Van Maanen, Forstmann, & Van Rijn, 2014 and Kononowicz & Van Rijn, 2011, for counter examples) were also observed in numerosity trials (less pronounced than during time trials, but evidently observable). What we learned from this study and what inspired us to conduct a follow up study was that, when making temporal estimates, we use di erent kinds of information available to us, that is, not only temporal information. e degree of how much we rely on each information source di ers between individuals, and can potentially be captured with the MLE procedure. However, an open question that remained after this study was how reliable the ML-estimates are.
Chapter 2 is a report about a behavioral follow up study of the Raindrops task. Participants were invited for two sessions of experiments, separated by six to eight days. In the rst session, they completed a shorter version of the Raindrops task as described above (i.e., drops appeared and disappeared dynamically), a static version of the Raindrops task in which all drops appeared at interval onset and disappeared at interval o set, and a numerical Stroop task. In session two, participants were tested again in the Dynamic Raindrops task, another version of the Static Raindrops task, and in a traditional temporal comparison task (i.e., the stimuli were the same on each trial and did not di er in any other property than duration). is design allowed us to test the stability and reliability of the ML-estimates over time (from session 1 to session 2), over similar tasks (Dynamic and Static versions of the Raindrops task), and relate them to performance in traditional timing tasks (temporal comparison task) and other interference tasks (numerical Stroop task). Our main nding was that individual di erences in magnitude of interference in the Dynamic and Static Raindrops task were stable over sessions and over di erent task versions. ML-estimates obtained from the Raindrops tasks were also predictive of performance in the traditional timing task. is means that the amounts of temporal and non-temporal information participants use to make a temporal estimate are a stable trait or bias within individuals. We did not nd a relation to performance in the numerical Stroop task. In the studies presented in Chapter 1 and 2 we replicated previously observed temporal interference e ects, from a more practical perspective, and we demonstrate how the manipulated dimensions can be disentangled by the MLE procedure.
While the previous two chapters were concerned with the dimensions time and numerosity, Chapter 3 is concerned with the dimensions time and space. We often borrow the dimension of space to think about, talk about and conceptualize time: "My last vacation was too short", " e future lies ahead of us", or " e meeting was moved forward one hour". In interval timing experiments, however, motor reproductions (e.g., pressing a button for the duration of a to-be-estimated interval) are the predominant method of choice. If we cognize about time in terms of spatial dimensions, estimating intervals in terms of spatial dimension seems like a plausible alternative to motor reproductions. In the studies reported in Chapter 3, we tested di erences in accuracy, precision and e ciency between motor reproductions, timeline estimates (i.e., spatial estimates of intervals) and verbal estimates in a simple and in a more complex interval reproduction task. We concluded that each translation of time into another representation (motor, verbal or spatial) has its own advantages and disadvantages: Motor reproductions were slightly more precise (Experiment 1) and more accurate (Experiment 2) than timeline estimates; timeline estimates had the lowest reaction times and are therefore very e cient; and, although verbal estimates were most accurate and precise (Experiment 1), we found a bias towards integer units. Overall, our results suggest that we can exibly translate time into the task required format, and the choice of the most optimal estimation method is dependent on the experimental design.
Trying to isolate time from another dimension is a cumbersome endeavor. is is because manipulating two dimensions simultaneously (e.g., time and numerosity as in Chapter 1 and 2) gives rise to changes in other dimension, too (e.g., the rate of drops appearing). While this di culty will be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 1 and 2, the point I want to raise here is that, in a complex environment, time and changes in many other dimensions are rarely segregated. In Chapter 4, we tested participants' ability to estimate the duration of complex and more naturalistic stimuli. Short videos of an animated gure performing di erent everyday actions within a kitchen context served as stimuli. What is special about this study compared to the ones described in Chapter 1 to 3 is that i) stimuli had no clearly marked on-and o set; and ii) they varied in multiple properties (e.g., there are more fast movements when the animated gure is chopping vegetables compared to drinking from a cup). We found that, despite increased stimulus complexity, the data adhered to general interval timing laws: Variability of interval estimates increases with veridical duration (scalar property); and estimates of previous trials in uence the perceived duration of the current trial (temporal context e ects). is study is a step towards studying interval timing in ecologically valid settings and as a component of everyday cognitive performance (cf., Matthews & Meck, 2014; Van Rijn, 2018).
Lastly, in Chapter 5 I will discuss some of the main ndings reported in this thesis in the light of di erent models of time perception, with the conclusion that there may be no need for dedicated timing models. As an alternative and as a future direction for the eld of temporal cognition, I will propose to focus on temporality of cognition in an inter-and intradisciplinary way, given that all of our cognition is inherently extended in time and carries temporal information.
